Boeing has a new software bug that can disable automated flight guidance on its 737 Max jets at precisely the moment pilots need it most: during an aborted landing, low to the ground, with everything happening fast. The FAA is investigating. Airlines are already refusing to accept new planes with the affected software. And Boeing knew about this for nearly two years before it became a formal safety review.
What the Bug Actually Does
Here's the setup. A plane is coming in for a landing, autopilot engaged. Something goes wrong — another aircraft on the runway, bad weather, whatever — and the pilots have to abort the approach and go around. In that moment, according to CBS News, a glitch in the 737 Max's flight management computer can cause the vertical navigation system, called VNAV, to drop out and kick the aircraft to a simpler, less capable form of automated pitch control.
VNAV is the system that automatically maintains altitude along a flight path. Without it, pilots have to manage that manually, on top of everything else they're already doing during an aborted landing. If you're thinking that sounds like a lot to pile on at once, you're not wrong.
"How busy do you want your crew to be?" one airline source told CBS News. "Are you introducing distractions at the worst possible moment?" That's not a rhetorical question. That's someone who works in aviation describing a genuine operational nightmare, in the politest possible terms.
Boeing Knew About This in November 2024
CBS News has learned that an airline first flagged this issue to Boeing in November 2024. Boeing reviewed it and, in February 2025, concluded it was not a safety issue. Case closed, move on, nothing to see here.
Then, earlier this year, Boeing received what a source described as "additional information from operators" that was apparently concerning enough to force a formal safety review board. The board's findings were sent to the FAA this month. So Boeing sat on this for the better part of two years, told itself it was fine, and then changed course when its own customers pushed back hard enough.
The bug lives in versions 14 and 14.1 of the operating system for the Max's flight management computer. Boeing's initial bulletin told airlines a software fix would be ready sometime in 2028. Twenty. Twenty. Eight. The company says it is working to accelerate that timeline, but the fact that "maybe three years from now" was the opening offer tells you something about the pace at which Boeing moves on problems it has decided aren't really problems.
Airlines Are Not Waiting Around
Southwest Airlines and United Airlines have already told Boeing they will not accept delivery of new aircraft running the affected software, per CBS News. They'd rather take planes with an older version of the operating system than roll the dice on versions 14 and 14.1.
And for Southwest, that's a big deal. The Max 7 was certified with software version 14, and Southwest was set to start receiving Max 7 deliveries this fall. It's now unclear whether those deliveries happen at all, or when. Nearly the entire order book for the Max 7 is going to Southwest, so this isn't just an inconvenience for one airline. It's a potential bottleneck for the entire program.
Alaska, American, Southwest, and United all told CBS News that none of their currently flying 737 Max jets use the affected software. So the immediate risk to passengers in the air right now is limited. The crisis here is less about planes currently flying and more about what this does to Boeing's ability to deliver new ones.
The Max 10 Certification Is Now in Serious Trouble
The timing could not be worse for Boeing's financial situation. The 737 Max 10 was reportedly days away from receiving FAA certification, though it had been years behind schedule. The FAA review of this software issue could push that certification back further, and the Max 10 was using version 14.1 during its certification testing. That's one of the two affected versions.
The Max is Boeing's most important product. It's described by CBS News as a cash cow and central to the company's turnaround strategy. Boeing has been grinding through a brutal few years: the two crashes in 2018 and 2019 that killed 346 people due to defective MCAS software, the Alaska Airlines door panel blowout in January 2024 blamed on manufacturing failures, a machinist strike, credit downgrades, and ongoing FAA scrutiny that has capped production rates. Another software scandal is the last thing this company can absorb.
The FAA told CBS News it is aware of the issue, is working with Boeing and the airlines, and will convene a Corrective Action Review Board. The agency said it will take "immediate action" if it identifies a safety concern. Whether that standard is set high enough, given what we now know about how these reviews tend to go, is a question worth asking out loud.
Boeing Says Everything Is Fine, Technically
Boeing's spokesperson told CBS News that even if VNAV disengages, autopilot will still function, and that all pilots are trained to handle landings without VNAV. Both of those things are true. The autopilot doesn't go away. Pilots absolutely can land a plane manually. This is not a guaranteed crash scenario.
But "pilots can handle it" is not a great defense when you're talking about a high-workload, low-altitude, time-compressed emergency situation where your automation just silently changed states on you. The entire point of modern flight management systems is to reduce crew workload at critical moments. A bug that increases that workload at precisely the worst time is a problem, even if it's a manageable one, because aviation safety is about margins. It's about what happens when three things go wrong at once instead of just one.
Boeing's bulletin to airlines, sent last month, said the glitch is not an immediate safety issue. That may be technically accurate. It's also the same company that determined its MCAS software wasn't a problem until two planes fell out of the sky.
The Dingo Take
Boeing found out about this in November 2024, shrugged, and called it fine. Then its own airline customers came back with more data and Boeing quietly reversed course. That's the pattern. That's how it always goes. The company does not find these problems on its own. It waits until someone outside the building forces the issue, and then it reacts. That is not a quality control process. That is a liability management process with extra steps.
The offer of a software fix in 2028 is the detail that should make your jaw drop. Not 2026. Not next spring. 2028. Three years from discovery to patch, on a piece of software running on commercial aircraft that carry hundreds of millions of passengers a year. Imagine your bank's fraud detection software had a bug that kicked in during high-stress transactions and the bank's response was, look, we're targeting a fix for 2028, and everyone just nodded and moved on. That would not happen. But in commercial aviation, Boeing says 2028 and the initial response is to put out a bulletin about pilot procedures.
The airlines refusing new deliveries are doing exactly what they should be doing. They've been burned before. They know what Boeing's internal safety assessments are worth. The FAA setting up a review board is the correct move. What we don't yet know is whether any of it will move fast enough, or whether we're watching the same slow-motion institutional failure that preceded the last disaster, just with better PR this time around.
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